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Abstract— In this paper, a secure communication system 
composed of four chaotic oscillators is proposed. Two of these 
oscillators are unidirectionally coupled and employed as 
transmitter and receiver. The other two oscillators are 
indirectly coupled and are employed as keystream generators. 
The novelty lies in the generation of the same chaotic 
keystream both in the transmitter and receiver side for 
encryption and decryption purposes. We show, in particular, 
that it is possible to synchronize the two keystream generators 
even though they are not directly coupled. So doing, an 
estimation of the keystream is obtained allowing decrypting the 
message. The main feature of the proposed communication 
scheme is that the keystream cannot be generated with the sole 
knowledge of the transmitted chaotic signal, hence making it 
very secure. The performance of the proposed communication 
scheme is shown via simulation using the Chua and Lorenz 
oscillators. 
Keywords- Chaotic communication systems; chaotic 
synchronization; Lorenz System; Chua System 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The importance of chaotic synchronization for the 
development of secure communication systems is well-
understood by now [1-6]. In recent years, various chaotic 
synchronization methods have been proposed [3-5, 7, 8] 
together with a number of modulation methods for chaotic 
communication systems such as chaotic masking [1, 5], 
parameter modulation techniques [5], chaotic shift keying 
[2, 5], just to mention a few. Each of these methods requires 
chaotic synchronization for message extraction at the 
receiver side. On the other hand, different attacks methods 
have been derived in order to test the security of the 
modulation methods; namely the non-linear dynamics 
forecasting [9, 10], return maps analysis [11], artificial 
neural network analysis [12] and so on. As a result, methods 
like chaotic masking, parameter modulation techniques and 
chaotic shift keying were found not to be secure. Other 
proposed methods based on the projective synchronization 
[13], phase synchronization [14], generalized synchronized 
[15] were broken as well [16, 17]. Methods based on the 
time delay or the hyperchaos were also looked upon for 
increasing the security but they too were found not to be 
entirely convincing [18, 19]. Therefore, there is a need of 
developing a method which will resist all the attack 
methods. 
In [6], a method based on encryption technique was 
proposed, where a different output from chaotic transmitter 
which was transmitted in the channel was used as a 
keystream to encrypt the message signal. The encrypted 
message signal masked with another output of the chaotic 
oscillator was employed as the transmitted signal. It was 
claimed that since the intruder could not get hold of the 
keystream, it was impossible for the attackers to extract the 
message.  Unfortunately a later work done by Parker and 
Short [20] showed that it was still possible to extract the 
keystream from the transmitted chaotic signal since the 
keystream carried the information of the dynamics of the 
transmitter. In fact, since, both the carrier and keystream 
were the outputs of same oscillator; the carrier held the 
dynamics of the keystream as well. Therefore, it was 
impossible to hide the dynamics of the keystream from 
intruders, as a signal has to be transmitted from the 
transmitter to the receiver for synchronization and message 
transmission purpose. However, since the principle of the 
method proposed in [6] is nevertheless interesting, there is a 
real incentive for finding ways for improving the method by 
eliminating its shortcomings. 
In effect, in this paper, based on the spirit of the work in 
[6], we propose a new chaotic communication scheme 
composed of four chaotic oscillators. Two of those 
oscillators are uni-directionally coupled and employed as 
transmitter and receiver. The other two oscillators are 
indirectly coupled and are employed as keystream 
generators. The key idea therefore is to generate a chaotic 
carrier signal from one oscillator while a chaotic keystream 
is generated from another chaotic oscillator. A suitable 
encryption rule is employed in order to encrypt the message 
using the generated keystream. The encrypted message is 
then modulated with the chaotic carrier in order to generate 
the transmitted signal.  As a result, the transmitted signal 
does not contain the dynamics of the keystream oscillator, 
hence making it difficult for intruders to generate the 
keystream with the sole knowledge of the transmitted 
chaotic signal. At the receiver, the same keystream is 
generated and a decryption rule is applied to the recovered 
encrypted message signal that has been obtained from 
chaotic synchronization.  However, this scheme gives rise to 
an interesting question: Is it possible to synchronize two 
independent chaotic oscillators such that they generate 
same required keystream? It will be shown in the next 
section that, under some assumptions, it is still possible to 
synchronize two chaotic oscillators even though they are not 
uni-directionally coupled.  
An outline of the paper is as follow:  In Section II, the 
main methodology of the proposed technique is explained. 
In addition, indirect coupled synchronization is proven for a 
class of chaotic systems. In Section III, the proposed 
synchronization and secure chaotic communication scheme 
are implemented using the Lorenz system and Chua's 
system. In Section IV, simulation is carried out and results 
are outlined to show the performance of the proposed 
communication scheme. Finally, in Section V, concluding 
remarks are made. 
II. THE PROPOSED COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 
The proposed chaotic communication scheme, based on 
cryptography, is shown in Fig. 1. The novelty here lies in 
the generation of the keystream. The chaotic transmitter (T) 
is first used to generate two output signals, y1(t) and y2(t). 
The signal y1(t) is used for modulation purpose while output 
y2(t) is used to drive chaotic oscillator (A) whose structure is 
different from the transmitter (T). The output k(t) of key 
generator (A) is used as a keystream to encrypt the  message 
m(t) using an  encryption rule     . The resulting encrypted 
signal         is masked using y1(t) yielding the 
transmitted signal yt(t). The output yt(t) is fed back into the 
transmitter in the form of an output injection with the aim of 
cancelling the effect of non-linearity while performing 
synchronization at the receiver side. The modulated 
transmitted signal yt(t) is sent through the channel to the 
receiver.  
At the receiver end, upon receiving the signal   
    , the 
chaotic receiver (R) - which is similar in structure to the 
transmitter (T) - permits to obtain an estimate  ̂     and 
 ̂    of the signals y1(t) and y2(t) respectively by 
synchronization. This can be done by using any techniques 
existing in the literature such as observers, etc [3, 4, 7, 8]. 
The signals  ̂     and   
     are used to generate an estimate 
 ̂       of the encrypted signal        . The estimate 
 ̂     is used to drive the chaotic key generator (B) - which 
is similar in structure to generator (A) – and which yields 
the keystream estimate  ̂ (t).  Consequently, the message 
m(t) can be recovered by using the decryption rule       . 
Note that since, the chaotic key generators (A) and (B) 
are driven by y2(t) and  ̂     respectively, an indirect 
coupled synchronization is required between these two 
chaotic oscillators. Also, y2(t) and  ̂     are outputs of 
chaotic transmitter (T) and receiver (R) respectively and 
will be equal once synchronization is achieved. Intuitively, 
one would expect this synchronization to take place. 
However, in what follows this will be proven 
mathematically for a class of chaotic systems.  
The important part of this method is the generation of the 
keystream. No information regarding the keystream is 
transmitted in the channel. In [6], it was possible to estimate 
the particular state which was used as keystream (as shown 
in [20]) since the state that was transmitted in the channel 
had some information of the dynamics of the keystream as 
they were the state variables of same chaotic oscillator.  
In contrast, in this method, the keystream is generated 
from a chaotic oscillator with a totally different structure. It 
will not be possible to estimate the dynamics of the chaotic 
key generator from the signal being transmitted in the 
channel by using the method mentioned in [20]. Even if the 
intruder manages to get hold of the encrypted signal from 
the transmitted signal, without the knowledge of keystream, 
the message signal can’t be decrypted back. Therefore, a 
secure communication link can be realized by implementing 
the proposed method. 
Based on the communication scheme illustrated by Fig. 1, 
we assume that the transmitter oscillator (T) described by a 
dynamical system of the following form:  
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where the state      with initial condition        . 
The outputs of the oscillator       and     . The 
matrix F is of appropriate dimension while h1 and h2 are 
analytical vector functions. The signal      is the 
transmitted signal where      is the encryption function 
using key k(t) and the function g is a smooth bounded 
function of time. 
The keystream k(t) is generated using another chaotic 
oscillator of similar form: 
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 which is driven by the output       . Here,    
  (q is not 
necessarily equal to n),     is the keystream, h is an 
analytical vector function and b2 is a smooth bounded 
function of time. It is assumed that the channel is perfect 
and that no distortion of the transmitted signal has taken 
place; that is      
 . 
The receiving chaotic oscillator (R) is given by:  
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of the proposed chaotic communication based on cryptography. 
 
Finally, the key generator (B) is given by: 
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We shall make the following assumptions: 
A1) There exist symmetric positive definite (SPD) matrices 
P1, P2, Q1 and Q2 such that 
                    
             
A2) The output function       is globally Lipschitzian with 
respect to x. 
The objective is to show that the transmitter (T) and the 
receiver (R) synchronize as well as generators (A) and (B) 
are synchronized with each other even though there is no 
direct link between them. In effect, based on the above 
assumptions, we state the following: 
Theorem 1. Under the assumption A1), there exist two 
constants 0,   such that )0(ˆ)0()(ˆ)( xxetxtx t    
for all 0t . In other words, the receiver (R) synchronizes 
exponentially with the transmitter (T). 
Proof: Let ),(ˆ)()( txtxt   then the error dynamics 
between transmitter (T) and receiver (R) is given by:
 
.)(  tyF  
Owing to assumption A1), a candidate Lyapunov 
function of the above error dynamics can be chosen as: 
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Since Q1 is SPD, there exist, 1c , 02 c such that 
.12111  PQP
TTT cc   Consequently,
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Integrating the last equation results in:  
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Again, since P1 is SPD, there exist 1 , 02   such that 
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That is: 
.)0(ˆ)0()(ˆ)( xxetxtx t    
This means that )(ˆ tx  converges to )(tx  exponentially. In 
other words, the receiver (R) synchronizes exponentially 
with the transmitter (T). This completes the proof of 
Theorem 1. 
Theorem 2. Assume that system (A) and (B) satisfies 
assumption A1), then 0)(ˆ)(lim  tztzt . That is, the 
keystream generator (A) synchronizes asymptotically with 
the keystream generator (B). 
Proof: Set ),(ˆ)()( tztzt   then the error dynamics 
between the keystream generator (A) and generator (B) is 
given by:
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Now consider the following candidate Lyapunov function 
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Now,
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From the above inequality, we can see that when t
.0)( t  
This completes the proof of Theorem 2 and therefore (A) 
converges with (B) asymptotically. Once the 
synchronization is obtained between (A) and (B), the 
message can be decrypted by applying the keystream. 
III. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED TECHNIQUE USING 
THE CHUA AND THE LORENZ OSCILLATOR 
In this section, the performance of the proposed 
communication system is demonstrated using the Lorenz 
system as the transmitter (T) and the receiver (R). More 
specifically, (T) and (R) are chosen as: 
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(6) 
Again it can easily be seen that (6) are in the form (1) and 
(3) with )( tyF  given as: 
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For these systems Assumption A1 hold true for the 
following choice of matrices 1P  and 1Q : 
where  0,,,,, 321 rblll  , 34
1
2 ll   and 2
4
10 ll  . 
Remark 1. Note that, at first sight one would expect the 
matrices 1P  and 1Q  to be time dependent since )( tyF  is 
time dependent. However, interestingly, due to the 
particular form of )( tyF  the matrices turn out to be 
constants. 
For the key generating oscillators A and B, the Chua’s 
system is adopted given as below:
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The non-linear function )(f  is a piecewise linear 
function given as: 
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Note that 7 are in the form (2) and (4) respectively with 
A  and ),( 22 ytb  given as: 
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It can also be shown that Assumption A1) is satisfied for 
the following matrices 2P  and 2Q : 
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Finally, it is obvious that A2) is satisfied. For the key 
generating oscillators A and B, the Lorenz system defined 
as is adopted: 
The encryption function (.)e  used is a n-shift cipher 
algorithm given as: (as used in [6]): 
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is a non-linear function given by:  
,
2for     ,2
for            ,
2for     ,2
),(









hkmhhkm
hkmhkm
hkmhhkm
kmf
 
with h being an encryption parameter which is chosen such 
that m and k lie within the interval ],[ hh . 
Once the keystream generator (A) synchronizes 
asymptotically with generator (B), the message )(tm  can be 
recovered using a decryption rule corresponding to the 
encryption rule and which is given by:
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where )(ˆ tk  is the 
estimated key stream and .ˆ))((ˆ 1yytme t   
In the next section, simulations are carried out using 
Matlab/Simulink and it will be shown that the proposed 
method is able to synchronize satisfactorily and extract the 
message successfully. 
 
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS 
The parameters employed in equation (15,16,18 and 19) 
are as follows: 
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The encryption parameter h  is chosen to be 3.0  and the 
message ).2sin(1.0)( ttm  Also in encryption rule, a 30-
shift cipher is used. The initial conditions for each oscillator 
are chosen to arbitrarily different. 
Fig. 2 shows the autocorrelation function of the 
keystream signal )(tk . It is clear that the keystream is not 
similar to itself with any amount of time shift so its 
autocorrelation function has only a single spike at point of 
zero time shift. This means the keystream generated is 
chaotic in nature and therefore has limited predictability. 
Fig. 3 shows the encrypted message signal using (21) and 
signal )(tk  as keystream. Fig. 4 depicts the transmitted 
chaotic carrier and it can be seen that message signal is 
totally buried inside it. 
Fig. 5 illustrates the error in estimating the keystream and 
it can be seen that although two oscillators are starting from 
different initial conditions, the error converges rapidly to 
zero after some initial period taken for synchronization.  
Fig. 6 shows the performance of the proposed method in 
decrypting the message signal back and it is readily seen 
that the transmitted message signal has been estimated 
convincingly. Next, the performance of the proposed secure 
communication method is tested in the presence of channel 
noise. For this purpose, the simulation is performed using 
the AWGN channel having SNR of 40 dB. The output is 
shown in Fig. 7, where it can be seen that message is 
extracted successfully. Apart from the jitter in amplitude, 
which can be removed from standard filtering operation, the 
necessary information about the message (form, frequency 
and amplitude) is obtained. 
It is seen that the proposed method is used to transmit 
simple sinusoidal message signals. But the method is 
equally true for other message signals such as voice signals, 
square wave, etc. Also, the idea can be easily extended from 
analogue systems here to digital communication systems 
with proper modulation schemes. The modulation schemes 
can be PAM, FSK, PSK, etc. With digital communication 
systems, the SNR up to which the method works with noisy 
channel can easily be reduced from 40 dB. For, example, 
when PAM is used for transmitting digital bits then, after 
recovering the modulated square wave that has been 
corrupted with noise, it can easily be passed to matched 
filter and then threshold detected to recover the digital bits 
accurately.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Autocorrelation of key stream signal k(t). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Encrypted message signal        . 
 
 
Fig. 4. Transmitted signal yt(t) generated from oscillator T.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Synchronization error in estimation of keystream. 
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Fig. 6. Plot of the extracted message mr(t) and m(t). 
 
 
Fig. 7. Message extraction in AWGN channel of SNR 40 dB. 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, a method of synchronizing two chaotic 
oscillators that are not directly coupled together in a master-
slave configuration is proposed and applied to generate the 
keystream at transmitter and receiver. Synchronization is 
proven mathematically and simulation results are presented. 
The main advantage of the proposed method is that, unlike 
previous work on the topic, the keystream is generated from 
a different oscillator to that of the transmitter and hence 
improving the security of the system; since the transmitted 
signal does not include the information of the dynamics of 
the key generator. Consequently, even if the encrypted 
signal is known to the intruders, without the knowledge of 
the keystream extraction of the message signal will not be 
possible providing secure communication link. As future 
works, the communication scheme can be extended by 
employing more general chaotic systems and incorporating 
observers for the receiver and the key generator. Also, the 
scheme need to be implemented and tested practically. 
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